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Abstract 
 
It was a hope of LDCs that the DOHA round would bring them greater market access 
in OECD countries than for non-LDCs. Using HS-6 tariff level data for the US and 
the EU for 2004, this paper estimates that, once the erosion from preferential access 
into the EU to non-LDCs are taken into account, LDCs have about a 3% preferential 
margin in the EU market. In the US market, in spite of preferences under AGOA, on 
a trade-weighted basis, LDCs are discriminated against. Under various “Swiss 
formulas” for tariff cuts, effective market access for LDCs in the EU will be negligible 
and still negative in the US. If the US were to apply a 97% rule (i.e. duty-free, quota-
free access for all but three percent of the tariff lines), LDCs could increase exports 
by 10% or about $1billion annually. Effective market access is further reduced by 
complicated Rules of Origin (RoO) applied by the EU and the US. Furthermore, 
generally, the most restrictive RoO fall on products in which LDCs have the greatest 
preferential market access. 
 
 
JEL classification: F13, F15 
 
Keywords: Market Access, LDCs, Rules of Origin,  
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1. Introduction 
 
The Doha round has been launched as a “development round” and has faltered so far 
for a number of reasons including market accesss for LDCs. Many observers feel that 
a sine qua non for completing a “successful” round, LDCs need to be convinced of  
getting some or greater preferential market access to OECD countries. By greater 
market access is understood greater market access than other non-LDC developing 
countries who already receive some by what is sometimes called “trade-preferences-
for-development” (TPFD). The more ancient Generalized System of Preferences” 
(GSP) initiative and the recent EU “Everything But Arms” (EBA) initiative initiated 
in 2002 are the two vehicles for implementing TPFD. Upon adoption of the “enabling 
clause” in 1971, an exception to the “Most-Favored Nation” (MFN) principle became 
possible for developing countries and was put in place under the GSP scheme under 
which developed countries grant unilaterally preferences to developing countries 
without requiring reciprocal preferences from them. Under this scheme, 178 
countries benefit from better-than-MFN treatment under the GSP scheme (see the 
list in annex 1).  
 
“Trade-preferences-for-development” has been in place since 1971 and has been 
implemented to varying degrees across countries. Importantly, preferential access 
has been occurring alongside with: (i) multilateral reduction in tariffs; (ii) a spread of 
reciprocal Regional Trade Preferences (RTAs), many between a Northern partner 
(most often the EU or the US) and a Southern partner. Both developments reduce 
the preferential market access actually enjoyed by GSP countries and by the subset of 
50 LDCs which are the focus of this paper. Furthermore, the extent of preferences 
actually accruing through non-reciprocal preferential schemes like the GSP is further 
complicated by the fact that the proliferation of preferential trading agreements 
(mostly FTAs) has been accompanied by complex rules (called rules of origin, RoO) 
to determine eligibility for preferential status. While RoO are necessary to prevent 
trade deflection, it is increasingly recognized that they deny market access by 
increasing the costs of those who are supposed to benefit from preferential status.  
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For many observers TFPD is in effect “giving away with one hand (preferences) and 
taking away with another (restrictive rules of origin”)1 
 
The issue then is how much market access the LDCs might expect from duty-free 
quota-free for the quasi totality of tariff lines in the major OECD markets. More 
precisely, how much market access might be embodied in the combination of two 
proposals:  
• zero duty market access for 97 of the tariff lines in the industrialized countries 
• a simplification of RoO  (for greater effective market access). 
 
This paper assesses these two proposals for the two most important QUAD members, 
the US and the EU (these are the countries with the best data summarizing the 
effects of RoO on the use of preferences). Section 2 gives background information on 
the composition of exports to the QUAD by the 50 LDCs.  Sections 3 and 4 evaluate 
the potential extent of market access from combining the above two proposals in the 
two largest markets, the EU and the US markets. The analysis is carried at the most 
disaggregated level possible (usually the HS-6 or HS-8 tariff levels).  
 
Section 3 measures tariff and tariff-equivalent measures and gives several measures 
of the extent of preferential access that take into account the fact that the EU and US 
are engaged in many regional trade agreements (usually full FTAs) which in effect 
amounts to cancelling the preferential access that the LDCs might have from facing 
lower (including zero) tariffs than MFN rates In the case of the EU it is quite simple 
since all LDCs get duty-free quota-free (DFQF) market access. The estimates of 
market access to LDCs show that the average effective market access for LDCs in the 
EU is cut by a third to a 3% preferential margin once one factors in the FTAs of the 
EU which give DFQF access to other trading partners that are competing with LDCs 
in the markets in which they export to the EU. This preferential margin could be cut 
to an average of 1.5.% if the DOHA round leads to a tariff cut by a Swiss-type 
formula. For the US, once one takes into account the FTAs of the US, on average, 
LDCs are already discriminated against in the US market. This implies that the US 
could give market access by application of the “97%” DFQF formula. 
                     
1  See the contributions in Cadot et al. eds (2006) that document the various ways in which rules of 
origin have been captured by vested interests. 
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For the US, it is more difficult more difficult to assess how much market access might 
result from the “97%” formula. Section 4 provides estimates of the market access that 
would result if the US were to grant 0% tariffs on 97% of its tariff lines. As discussed 
in section 4, the tariff cuts would mostly concern Textiles and Apparel (T&A) which 
are excluded from GSP preferences and non-AGOA LDCs. Depending on elasticity 
assumptions, estimates suggest an increase in exports to the US of 10% (and ot 15% if 
the US were to apply zero-tariffs on all tariff lines exported by the LDCs)  
 
Section 5 addresses the more challenging task of quantifying how much market 
access is actually taken away by having to comply with what many view as more-
stringent-than-necessary rules of origin (RoO) to meet origin requirements to qualify 
for preferential access.  While it is true that reciprocal preferential arrangements also 
face similar barriers due to the application of (usually) the same set of RoO, it is 
argued that, as a result of their complexity which we document using various 
synthetic measures, the LDCs are unnecessarily and excessively penalized in OECD 
markets. 
 
Section 6 concludes with a summary of main findings and with policy 
recommendations on the gains from extending DFQF access and on the gains from 
simplifying RoO.  
 
2. LDC Exports to the QUAD  
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of exports of the 50 LDC countries that would be 
beneficiaries of increased market access to the QUAD.  The proposed measures could 
affect up to 55% of their exports (45% of their exports are to other countries), 
although as shown in figure 2 they already have DFQF access for 20% (EU) and 40% 
(US) of the tariff lines of these countries.  
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Figure 1. LDC exports by main markets 
(in % of total LDC trade), 2004. 
 
Source : Author’s calculations based on mirror data from COMTRADE 
and table 1 
 
 
Table 1 gives the details behind these aggregate figures, the first part of the table 
giving the shares by each country to each QUAD member, the second part of the 
table giving country shares in each one of the QUAD. Several patterns stand out. 
Most LDCs are ex-colonies of EU members so they export more to the EU than to the 
US They are also geographically closer to the EU market). In volume, Bangladesh is 
the most important member in the LDC group, whether it is exports to the US or to 
the EU. Note that Bangladesh exports almost twice as much (33% vs. 18%) to the EU 
than to the US. Given that all the LDCs, including Bangladesh, export similar baskets 
of goods, this large difference in export shares to the two destinations reflects the 
DFQF access to the EU while the low share to the US reflects the fact that T&A are 
excluded from the US GSP. Also a large number of SSA countries have very small 
shares ranging below one percent, especially if oil exporters are excluded. Finally, we 
use 2004 data because it is the year for which we have the most recent exhaustive 
information on tariffs and the tariff equivalents of other barriers to trade in 
agriculture in the EU and US markets. 
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Table 1. LDC exports by main markets, 2004. 
EU27 USA JPN CAN Others ALL EU27 USA JPN CAN Others
Afghanistan 18.8% 12.7% 0.5% 0.1% 67.8% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5%
Angola 9.3% 37.5% 0.1% 0.0% 53.1% 20.9% 6.8% 36.1% 0.4% 0.0% 25.3%
Burundi 66.8% 9.6% 0.8% 0.5% 22.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Benin 8.9% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 90.7% 0.7% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5%
Burkina Faso 13.8% 0.2% 2.8% 0.0% 83.2% 0.6% 0.3% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 1.2%
Bangladesh 57.9% 24.4% 1.4% 3.7% 12.5% 16.5% 33.1% 18.5% 5.8% 42.9% 4.7%
Bhutan 1.6% 0.3% 4.6% 0.0% 93.5% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3%
Central African Republic 72.9% 6.5% 1.6% 0.1% 18.9% 0.2% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
Comoros 30.3% 43.7% 1.5% 0.2% 24.3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Cape Verde 71.4% 17.4% 0.6% 0.1% 10.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Djibouti 14.1% 2.4% 0.0% 0.3% 83.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Eritrea 44.1% 4.2% 7.1% 0.1% 44.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Ethiopia 44.7% 8.3% 13.5% 0.9% 32.5% 0.9% 1.4% 0.3% 3.0% 0.6% 0.7%
Guinea 45.6% 8.0% 0.1% 1.7% 44.6% 1.6% 2.6% 0.6% 0.1% 1.9% 1.7%
Gambia, The 45.4% 1.1% 2.3% 0.1% 51.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
Guinea-Bissau 5.4% 24.8% 0.4% 0.0% 69.4% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3%
Equatorial Guinea 22.9% 29.4% 1.1% 6.1% 40.4% 7.0% 5.5% 9.5% 1.9% 29.7% 6.4%
Haiti 4.1% 89.0% 0.2% 4.1% 2.6% 0.7% 0.1% 2.9% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0%
Cambodia 28.3% 54.0% 3.4% 3.7% 10.6% 4.8% 4.7% 12.0% 4.1% 12.2% 1.2%
Kiribati 9.9% 14.5% 46.7% 0.1% 28.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Lao PDR 45.9% 0.8% 1.8% 1.5% 49.9% 0.7% 1.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.8% 0.8%
Liberia 72.0% 7.7% 0.0% 0.6% 19.8% 1.9% 4.7% 0.7% 0.0% 0.7% 0.9%
Lesotho 5.6% 91.4% 0.1% 2.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.2% 3.7% 0.0% 1.2% 0.0%
Madagascar 50.5% 36.1% 2.5% 1.6% 9.3% 2.2% 3.9% 3.7% 1.4% 2.4% 0.5%
Maldives 17.1% 40.6% 10.2% 1.1% 31.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.7% 0.9% 0.3% 0.2%
Mali 22.7% 1.1% 0.1% 0.1% 76.1% 0.6% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0%
Myanmar 18.4% 0.0% 5.6% 0.6% 75.3% 5.2% 3.3% 0.0% 7.4% 2.2% 8.9%
Mozambique 75.2% 0.7% 1.1% 0.0% 23.0% 2.7% 6.9% 0.1% 0.8% 0.0% 1.4%
Mauritania 53.7% 0.9% 13.4% 0.0% 32.0% 1.4% 2.6% 0.1% 4.6% 0.0% 1.0%
Malawi 39.2% 12.4% 2.5% 0.2% 45.7% 0.9% 1.2% 0.5% 0.5% 0.1% 0.9%
Niger 54.9% 9.4% 8.4% 0.6% 26.7% 0.5% 0.9% 0.2% 1.0% 0.2% 0.3%
Nepal 18.7% 22.8% 1.1% 1.7% 55.7% 1.1% 0.7% 1.2% 0.3% 1.3% 1.4%
Rwanda 9.1% 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 89.2% 0.6% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2%
Sudan 4.2% 0.1% 33.2% 0.0% 62.4% 6.3% 0.9% 0.0% 53.0% 0.0% 9.0%
Senegal 40.1% 0.4% 2.0% 0.1% 57.5% 1.5% 2.1% 0.0% 0.8% 0.1% 2.0%
Solomon Islands 6.2% 1.8% 9.4% 0.0% 82.6% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0% 0.6%
Sierra Leone 82.4% 4.7% 0.1% 1.2% 11.6% 0.4% 1.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.1%
Somalia 2.4% 0.8% 1.4% 0.1% 95.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3%
Sao Tome and Principe 65.9% 0.7% 0.0% 0.8% 32.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Chad 20.8% 59.7% 0.0% 0.0% 19.5% 2.3% 1.6% 6.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0%
Togo 15.2% 0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 84.2% 0.8% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 1.5%
Tuvalu 89.4% 2.3% 0.0% 0.0% 8.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Tanzania 40.4% 2.4% 7.4% 0.2% 49.6% 1.8% 2.5% 0.2% 3.3% 0.2% 2.0%
Uganda 59.7% 5.6% 1.8% 0.7% 32.2% 0.9% 1.8% 0.2% 0.4% 0.4% 0.6%
Vanuatu 12.2% 1.0% 7.8% 0.2% 78.8% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.7% 0.1% 0.6%
Samoa 26.9% 31.9% 6.3% 0.1% 34.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Yemen 1.8% 1.6% 1.7% 0.0% 94.9% 6.8% 0.4% 0.5% 2.9% 0.0% 14.7%
Congo, Dem. Rep. 75.5% 10.8% 0.8% 0.0% 12.9% 2.0% 5.2% 1.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.6%
Zambia 15.4% 2.2% 6.5% 0.0% 75.8% 2.4% 1.3% 0.2% 4.0% 0.0% 4.2%
Total LDC 28.9% 21.8% 4.0% 1.4% 43.9% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Exports (in % of each LDC total exports) to: Share of each LDC in the total LDC export to:
Countries
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on mirror data from COMTRADE 
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3. How Much Preferential Market Access 
 
To ascertain the extent of preferential market access, we used two criteria: (i) data as 
disaggregated as possible on a comparable basis: (ii) data giving reasonable 
measures of the tariff equivalent of NTB measures (e.g. tariff-quotas for agriculture 
and of the special regime for EU preferences accorded to ACP countries). As 
explained in annex 1, for the EU we merged two data bases and ended up creating a 
data base at the HS-8 level in which all preferential regimes of the EU-27 were taken 
into account. These include the GSP, ACP, EBA, and all other preferential 
agreements signed by the EU27 by 2004. For the US, we relied on the MacMap HS6 
v2.1 database developed jointly by CEPII and IFPRI using ITC contributions: As 
explained in annex 1, the US data base is at the HS-6 level (5113 products) with 
bilateral tariffs and, for lines with specific tariffs, the Ad-Valorem Equivalent (AVE) 
of the applied tariff. Preferential regimes are also taken into account when 
computing the tariff applied by the US. The preferential regimes for the US include 
the GSP, AGOA, and all the FTAs signed by the US in 2004. 
 
3.1 Tariff Barriers in the EU and US markets 
 
For reasons detailed in annex 1, LDCs face different tariffs in the EU and the US: 
- In the EU-27 market, the 50 LDCs have duty-free quota-free (DFQF) access. 
This is because we take into account that the Special regime for bananas, rice and 
sugar is about to expire (and will have expired by the time the “97%” proposal 
would be applied) and also because chapter 93 “Arms and Ammunitions” is not 
included in the list of HS-8 products 
- In the US market, LDCs are a heterogeneous group. AGOA LDCs get DFQF  
access but other LDCs face tariffs  (see details in figure 2 below) Thus, on average 
the LDC group has less preference than AGOA-eligible countries and of course 
less market access than all countries in an FTA with US.  
 
These characteristics of the tariffs faced by the LDC group in both markets are 
summarized in figure 2.  
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Figure 2. The Cumulative Tariffs Schedules of the EU and US T by main partners 
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Note : total of 9427 HS8 lines, 1.36% (1.24%) of lines have an MFN 
(ACP) tariff higher than 50%.  
2b. Distribution of US Tariffs, MFN/AGOA/LDC 
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Note : total of 5113 HS6 lines, 0.25% of lines have an MFN tariff 
higher than 50%. 
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The figure depicts the cumulative tariff schedules of the two countries for three 
groups of partners (according to the extent of preferential status) for each country: 
the least favored (MFN) partners, followed by the ACP and LDC for the EU and by 
the AGOA and LDC group for the US. Although the two distributions are not strictly 
comparable since one is at the HS-8 level and the other at the HS-6 level, by 
comparing the two cumulative distributions, one sees that the EU has a lower share 
of zero tariffs (about 20% to the 40% for the SU) and hence has a bit more preference 
to “give away” (but not for the LDC group). Figure 2 also shows that the LDC group 
gets DFQF to the EU, while this is not the case for the US where the AGOA 
beneficiaries face lower tariffs than the other LDCs. 
 
Table 3 gives further details on the tariffs faced by LDCs in the US market for each 
LDC with an emphasis on the number of lines on which each LDC face a positive 
tariff in the US market. Take for example, Bangladesh that exports $2.4 billion over 
796 tariff lines (15.6% of the total US HS-6 lines). Of the 812 tariff lines with positive 
imports from Bangladesh, 415 (or 8.1%) face a positive tariff. This means that even if 
the US removed tariffs on all but 3% of its tariff lines (at the HS-6 level), then 
Bangladesh would still face some positive tariffs on some of the lines it would export 
to the US. Note that Cambodia (4.8%), Myanmar (4.2%) and Nepal (3.9%) are the 
only other countries that would surpass the 3% threshold. Of course, whether the 
other LDCs would also face positive tariffs on the lines they currently export to the 
US would depend on how the “97%” rule is applied. However, as shown in column 
10, these lines represent a small amount of total exports.  
 
The figures in table 3 also show that the lines with positive exports can represent 
quite a large share of the total lines actually exported by LDCs (column 7) and also in 
the total value of the export to the US (column 9). Note also that, except for a few 
countries, the share in total export is not so large (column 10) because the first 
(main) trading partner is the EU27 for most of LDCs. 
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Table 3. Barriers of LDC Exports to US, 2004 
Countries
(US$ million)
% of total 
exports 
Nber % a/
Nber of 
lines
Nber with a 
positive 
tariff
% with a 
positive 
tariff % a/
% of total 
exports to US
% of total 
exports 
on all exports 
to US
on exports to 
US with positive 
tariff
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
=(3)/5113 =(6)/(7) =(6)/5113
LDC 11433.9 21.8% 50540 19.8% 4722 1429 30% 0.6% 40.7% 8.85% 4.0% 9.8%
Afghanistan 47.93 12.7% 2701 52.8% 58 27 47% 0.5% 3.5% 0.4% 0.2% 4.4%
Angola* 3635.59 37.5% 731 14.3% 39 0 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0% -
Bangladesh 2386.31 9.6% 796 15.6% 812 415 51% 8.1% 89.8% 8.7% 8.3% 9.6%
Benin* 2.24 0.4% 513 10.0% 33 2 6% 0.0% 12.5% 0.0% 0.7% 5.5%
Bhutan 1.28 0.2% 786 15.4% 21 6 29% 0.1% 38.3% 0.1% 2.1% 5.6%
Burkina Faso 3.57 24.4% 786 15.4% 48 3 6% 0.1% 2.8% 0.7% 0.4% 12.5%
Burundi 5.26 0.3% 786 15.4% 9 1 11% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 4.0%
Cambodia 1689.79 6.5% 796 15.6% 385 247 64% 4.8% 96.8% 6.3% 9.5% 9.8%
Cape Verde* 5.84 43.7% 512 10.0% 50 1 2% 0.0% 0.7% 0.3% 0.0% 5.0%
Central African Republic 8.92 17.4% 796 15.6% 37 2 5% 0.0% 0.7% 0.1% 0.0% 5.3%
Chad 293.96 2.4% 725 14.2% 21 1 5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.0%
Comoros 8.55 4.2% 796 15.6% 14 1 7% 0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 0.1% 9.0%
Congo, Dem. Rep.* 188.17 8.3% 725 14.2% 65 0 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0% -
Djibouti* 0.49 8.0% 734 14.4% 18 0 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0% -
East Timor 0.06 1.1% 3066 60.0% 2 1 50% 0.0% 16.7% 0.2% 0.2% 1.0%
Equatorial Guinea 782.83 24.8% 793 15.5% 20 0 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -
Eritrea 0.52 29.4% 1349 26.4% 21 4 19% 0.1% 26.9% 7.9% 2.5% 9.3%
Ethiopia* 35.21 89.0% 513 10.0% 138 6 4% 0.1% 0.7% 0.6% 0.0% 5.1%
Gambia, The* 0.81 54.0% 734 14.4% 27 5 19% 0.1% 7.4% 4.0% 0.4% 5.7%
Guinea* 74.35 14.5% 734 14.4% 90 3 3% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 12.2%
Guinea-Bissau* 25.28 0.8% 725 14.2% 6 0 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0% -
Haiti 320.65 7.7% 628 12.3% 253 84 33% 1.6% 86.1% 6.6% 10.8% 12.9%
Kiribati 1.01 91.4% 796 15.6% 8 0 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0% -
Lao PDR 3.69 36.1% 3064 59.9% 41 27 66% 0.5% 83.2% 30.1% 10.6% 13.0%
Lesotho* 406.81 40.6% 512 10.0% 75 2 3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.8%
Liberia 61.48 1.1% 3035 59.4% 45 19 42% 0.4% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6%
Madagascar* 349.99 0.0% 511 10.0% 209 5 2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.8%
Malawi* 95.34 0.7% 511 10.0% 108 4 4% 0.1% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 3.3%
Maldives 82.03 0.9% 3066 60.0% 83 66 80% 1.3% 97.7% 0.9% 8.9% 9.1%
Mali* 9.04 12.4% 513 10.0% 134 7 5% 0.1% 1.2% 0.2% 0.1% 7.4%
Mauritania 1.55 9.4% 734 14.4% 20 3 15% 0.1% 7.1% 0.7% 0.7% 10.4%
Mozambique* 13.64 22.8% 513 10.0% 83 3 4% 0.1% 41.3% 9.4% 55.5% 134.1%
Myanmar 383.81 1.7% 3066 60.0% 263 216 82% 4.2% 86.2% 1.4% 9.5% 11.0%
Nepal 184.32 0.1% 796 15.6% 350 197 56% 3.9% 89.3% 0.1% 7.6% 8.6%
Niger* 38.41 0.4% 513 10.0% 126 5 4% 0.1% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 7.8%
Rwanda* 4.75 1.8% 512 10.0% 25 0 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0% -
Samoa 18.09 4.7% 793 15.5% 131 16 12% 0.3% 10.3% 0.5% 0.7% 7.1%
Sao Tome and Principe* 0.68 0.8% 734 14.4% 15 0 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0% -
Senegal* 12.9 0.7% 519 10.2% 136 12 9% 0.2% 1.6% 0.0% 0.1% 8.5%
Sierra Leone 9.45 59.7% 513 10.0% 158 2 1% 0.0% 0.4% 0.3% 0.0% 2.8%
Solomon Islands 3.03 0.4% 1381 27.0% 24 2 8% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2%
Somalia 0.92 2.3% 786 15.4% 29 3 10% 0.1% 13.0% 0.3% 1.0% 7.9%
Sudan 2.37 2.4% 3034 59.3% 8 2 25% 0.0% 2.1% 0.1% 0.0% 1.8%
Tanzania* 30.55 5.6% 513 10.0% 177 14 8% 0.3% 6.0% 0.3% 0.4% 7.0%
Togo 13.58 1.0% 796 15.6% 46 7 15% 0.1% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 7.4%
Uganda* 31.71 31.9% 512 10.0% 104 1 1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 2.0%
Vanuatu 3.19 1.6% 793 15.5% 26 2 8% 0.0% 20.4% 0.3% 2.3% 11.1%
Yemen 133.33 10.8% 786 15.4% 47 0 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0% -
Zambia* 20.62 2.2% 513 10.0% 84 5 6% 0.1% 1.1% 0.0% 0.1% 9.5%
Weighted Applied Tariff  
(including AVE)
Total Lines with a 
positive applied tariff 
(exported or not to the 
US)
Exports to US 
Exports value with a 
positive tariff to the US
Only Lines actually  exported to the US
 
Note:  
No data for Tuvalu 
* AGOA countries in 2004 according to http://www.agoa.gov/eligibility/country_eligibility.html  
Other non-LDC AGOA in 2004: Botswana, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland. 
a) Maximum number of lines for all countries = 5113 (number of products at the HS6 level) – we use 
50*5113 for the LDC computation as a group.  
 
Source: Authors calculation based on MacMap HS6 v2.1 and mirror data in 
COMTRADE 
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So far we have been reasoning at the intensive margin, i.e. as if the elimination of 
tariffs by the US on LDC exports would not bring new products to be exported to the 
US. This would obviously not be the case, but can we guess how important new 
products might be, i.e. should one expect substantial changes at the extensive margin 
since some goods not already exported to the US might be start to be exported under 
duty-free entry on the US market? If one neglects the impact of differences in 
transport costs to the US and EU markets across countries, one can compare the 
goods exported by LDCs to the DFQF EU market with those exported to the US 
markets respectively.  As we show below, the same set of goods are exported to both 
markets, so that reasoning at the intensive margin as we have been doing implicitly is 
probably a good-enough first approximation.  
 
3.2 How Much Preferential Market Access? 
 
Since the proposals on the table are for all LDCs, all measures will treat the LDCs as 
a group, usually taking trade-weighted averages (the alternative of combining 
product-weighted averages at the country level with simple averages across countries 
would give too much weight to small countries of which there are many (see table 1).  
  
A useful first start at evaluating the extent of market access is to measure the average 
preferential margin received by the LDC group in each market. The top of figure 3a 
indicates a current preferential access of 4.6% in the EU market and less than 
1%(0.86%) in the US. As mentioned earlier, the very low figure for the US (in spite of 
AGOA) is because the preferences on T&A are excluded from the GSP. Indeed, this is 
confirmed by considering the applied tariff on the top 25 products exported by the 
LDCs in the US market given in table 4b. In most cases, the applied tariff is close to 
the MFN tariff, the lower rate being due to the zero tariffs applied on AGOA exports 
 
Next, factor in the potential consequences of a successful conclusion to the DOHA 
round negotiations. We simulate this by applying the ”Swiss formula” for MFN tariff 
reductions by the OECD (see annex 2 for the parameters used). Then, as shown in 
figure 3, the preferential margins for sales to the EU market will be drastically cut to 
a level of less than 2%. As a point of reference, an often-heard cited figure of the costs 
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of compliance for meeting origin requirements is in the 1%-3% range of the value of 
the products (Cadot and de Melo (2007) summarize the evidence).  
 
Figure 3  LDCs’ Average Preferential margins, 2004 
(Weighted by the LDC export value at the product level) 
 
3a. EU27 market 
 
3b. US market 
 
Source: Authors calculation  
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The most pertinent pattern in figure 3 relates to the erosion of market access to the 
EU and US due to the numerous FTAs of both countries. Indeed,  when one 
measures preferential access in terms not of the MFN tariff, but of the effective tariff 
paid by competing sellers in the EU and the US markets the preference margin 
enjoyed by the LDCs is very small. In the EU market, the current adjusted 
preferential margin is around 3% , and in the US it is negative.2 This means, that the 
LDCs are discriminated against in the US market for the main products they sell 
there because the US has FTAs with trade partners that compete with them in the US 
market 
 
Another useful summary of the distribution of preferential access across products 
is to plot, in decreasing order, the top 100 products exported towards the EU or the 
US against the normalized (to 100%) cumulative unadjusted preferential margins 
on the vertical axis. This results in a step-like figure with the height of a step 
indicating the relative importance of preferences to the HS-8 (HS-6) product 
drawn on the x-axis. So a steep step approaching a vertical line means a very small 
product with a high preference margin. In effect, figure 4 traces “Lorenz-like” 
curves in the export/preference-margin space.3.  As a reference, suppose that each 
product had a preferential access proportional to its share in total exports on the X-
axis.  Then the solid unadjusted line would bisect the graph.  Hence, once the 
products are sorted in decreasing order (in terms of export value), the more convex 
is the curve below the diagonal, the more preferential access is biased towards 
products with small export shares to the EU or the US. Annex 2 gives more details 
on the construction of the curves and shows the corresponding curves for 
Bangladesh.  
                     
2
 Annex 2 gives the details on the formula and on the partners that are assumed to benefit from duty-
free access to the EU or US market. Note that even if one could argue that costs associated with 
proving origin would in effect give less effective preferential access to countries competing with LDCs 
in the EU and US markets, as detailed in annex 3, the rules of origin faced by the LDCs in the EU and 
US markets are as stringent (and most of the time the same) as those facing FTA partners (e.g. Mexico 
in the US market or Morocco in the EU market). 
3
 Strictly speaking, the curves, are not Lorenz curves. First:  the cumulative export shares do not add 
up to the same total so that the slopes of the curves are not strictly comparable. Second, the shares on 
the horizontal axis are not the same (e.g. quintiles or deciles) 
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Figure 4  
Cumulative exports against Cumulative Preferences 
(Top 100 exporter products, 2004) 
 
4a. to the EU27 
 
4b. to the US 
 
Source: Authors calculation  
 
Figure 4 is aggregated over all LDCs so it gives a synthetic measure of how the LDC 
group fares in the market considered.  Drawn on the same principle, the two curves 
are comparable. Consider first the unadjusted preferential curves. They are both 
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quite steep in the upper portions corresponding to products with small market 
shares, but the US curve (figure 4b) is much flatter indicating less preferential 
margin for the top 100 products.  Since both curves plot the top 100 products which 
account for close to 90% of total sales in both markets, both curves indicate that that 
no preferences are granted for the top 45% (40%) of sales in the EU (US) market. In 
the case of the EU, the big vertical jump around 62% is for sugar which receives a 
66% unadjusted preferential margin (see table 4a).  
 
Next, observe a common pattern in both graphs: the steepness of the curves as one 
approaches the last 25 products or so. These are the products that would gain the 
most preferential access but they are also currently negligible in the export basket, 
never reaching 1/10 of one percent of export value. This means that the LDCs get 
preferences in markets where either they do not compete or in markets where they 
do not export much. This steep curve reflects several factors. The most important is 
that LDCs have a comparative advantage raw materials and primary products which, 
largely for political economy reasons, face low tariffs in developed countries.4  
Second, non-participation in the reciprocal reduction in protection negotiated 
multilaterally under the GATT auspices means that LDCs  have not secured market 
access for some products in which they would have comparative advantage. Also 
later on we give evidence that restrictive RoO are among the contributing factors to 
small export shares in markets with high preferential margins (table 7 displays the 
positive correlation between high preference margin and the restrictiveness of rules 
of origin). 
                     
4
 A key insight of the political-economy literature on trade policy is that producers of intermediates 
never get much protection because they face the lobbying activities of downstream industries. Also, 
for many of these products, there are no producers in the OECD markets. 
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Table 4. LDC’s Top 25 exported products: Adjusted Market access pre and post Doha round 
Table 4a: To the EU-27 
 
 
Source: Authors calculation 
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Table 4. LDC’s Top 25 exported products : Adjusted Market access pre and post Doha round 
Table 4b: To the US 
 
 
Source: Authors calculation 
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Next consider the adjusted curves (the solid red curves). By construction, they are 
everywhere below the unadjusted curves, the height between the two curves showing 
how much preferential access is lost from the granting of preferences by the EU and 
the US to competitors. A comparison of the two curves shows that the LDCs lose 
relatively more in the US than in the EU market. Second, and most importantly, the 
adjusted preferential margin turns negative, and remains so, meaning that, where 
they receive preferential margins, the LDCs usually receive less preference on average  
than their competitors (i.e. non-LDCs like Mexico, engaged in an FTA with the US). 
Thus, cumulating over the top 100 products (which account for 93% of the value of 
their total exports to the US, the LDCs receive a less favorable treatment than their 
competitors. 
 
Figure 4 also draws the curves that would result from a “successful” tariff reduction in 
DOHA. It is clear from the vertical distance between the two curves that if much 
preferential access would be lost, it would be mostly for the products that count little 
in total export value. This pattern reflects the application of the Swiss formula which 
reduces proportionately more the high tariffs. Finally table 4 lists the 25 most 
important products sold by the LDCs in the EU and US market respectively (tables 
A3.2.1 and A3.2 give the corresponding information for the top 25 products that 
would lose in market access from DOHA tariff reduction). 
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4. Potential Export Growth from a 97% QFDF in the US Market 
 
Since the EU grants DFQF access to the LDCs in their market, unless there is a 
relaxation on RoO, market access for the LDC group will erode in the future, for 
example if the DOHA round leads to a Swiss formula-type reduction for the  GATT-
bound tariffs. Table A3.2 lists in decreasing order the products that would lose the 
most in preferential access from such a reduction in tariffs. So in the EU market, the 
only increase in market access that the LDCs can hope for is a simplification of EU 
rules of origin notably for fish and T&A, both of which  sectors with high preferential 
margins and restrictive RoO.  This could well be the case since a drastic simplification 
of RoO has been negotiated for these two sectors in the context of the recent interim 
EPA negotiations and there is hope that this simplification would be applied at least 
to all LDCs if not to all GSP beneficiaries (see discussion below and Carrère and de 
Melo, 2008 for further discussion).  
 
On the other hand, in the US market there is room for gain in market access if, as 
proposed, the US preferentially eliminates tariffs on 97% of its tariffs for LDC 
imports. The issue then is how the 97% selection take place. We already know from 
figure 2b that about 40% of US tariff lines at the HS-6 level are duty-free. We assume 
that the selection of tariff lines is at the HS6-level.5  Since the zero-tariffs lines are 
bound at this level, these cannot be raised, so the issue is how to choose the 57% 
tariffs to be set to zero. As explained in annex 2.3, we presume that exclusion of the 
tariff lines will be largely based on two criteria: (i) those with the highest tariff rates 
and; (ii) those that weigh the most heavily in the political economy considerations 
entering in the decision process. This second criterion is approximated here by the 
tariff revenue at the tariff line level (there is no data on production at the HS6-level) 
from LDCs.  The results of ranking tariff lines for exclusion following this two-step 
procedure is shown in figure 5 (also see annex 2.3). 
 
Figure 5 gives the distribution of tariff lines excluded from zero-duty status for LDCs 
by the above selection criterion. The distribution of tariff lines excluded from zero-
                     
5
 We do not have more disaggregated data with similar-quality tariff and import data to check if there 
would be much difference if the selection was at a more disaggregated level, thereby giving more 
discretion to the US. At the HS-8 level, there are 10502 MFN tariff lines instead of 5113 at the HS6-
level with 37% that are currently duty free (from TRAINS, 2005).  
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duty status for LDCs (89 lines) is given in figures 5a and 5c. The bulk (67%) of 
excluded tariff lines faces a tariff in the 15-20% range and another 15% in the 20-25% 
range. However, figure 5c shows that the LDCs face less than the MFN tariffs for 
these lines since 44% of these 89 tariff lines face a tariff less than 15% in the US 
market while the corresponding MFN tariff is in the 15-20% range. Finally figure 5e 
shows the distribution of exports to the US that fall in each tariff range that would be 
excluded from duty-free status according to this selection rule. 
 
Figure 5b shows the distribution of MFN tariffs on the 1694 tariff lines that would be 
set to zero by the 97% proposal (of these only 510 currently have a positive MFN 
tariff-see table 5).  The corresponding distribution of tariffs applied on LDC exports is 
given in figure 5d. The difference between the two distributions captures the effects of 
AGOA which results in lower applied tariffs on LDC exports. Since these are trade-
weighted estimates, one can see that AGOA may matter because it applies to many 
countries but, because these countries have little weight in total imports to the US, 
the difference between the two distributions is rather small. Finally, figure 5f gives 
the current distribution of imports that would be under duty-free status according to 
this selection rule. 
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Figures 5: US tariff structure for LDC products with positive exports to US (HS6 lines) 
a. Distribution of US MFN tariff on excluded lines 
 (89 lines) 
b. Distribution of US MFN tariff on non excluded lines 
 (1694 lines) 
 
c. Distribution of US applied tariff on LDC  
exports (trade weighted) - excluded lines (89 lines) 
d. Distribution of US applied tariff on LDC  
exports (trade weighted) – non excluded lines 
(1694 lines) 
  
e. Distribution of US imports value from LDC by 
applied tariff - excluded lines (89 lines) 
f. Distribution of US imports value from LDC by 
applied tariff – non excluded lines (1694 lines) 
 
Note: we select as excluded lines 513 out of 5113 but here we report only the excluded and non 
excluded lines with positive LDC exports so respectively 89 and 1694 lines (see table 5). 
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Table 5 gives the same information from the point of view of the count of tariff lines 
selected by the formula. Thus the 3% benchmark would exclude 153 lines of which 89 
have positive LDC exports. As to the remaining lines with duty-free status, 95% would 
have positive LDC exports. The last three columns show the status of LDC exports 
after applying the proposal: 12% of tariff lines would still face positive tariffs because 
the proposal applies to some tariff lines for which LDCs have zero exports to the US. 
This point deserves emphasis, since the “97% proposal” implies that less than 97% of 
the lines in which the LDCs export to the US will face duty-free status. The last 
column shows that the proposal would still result in an average (trade-weighted) 
tariff of 15% on the tariff lines with positive tariffs. 
 
Table 5: Selection of US Tariff lines for exclusion from duty-free status for LDC (HS6 level) 
 
Source: authors’ computations. 
Notes: 
a) Excluded: see annex A.2.3 for description of exclusion from duty-free status for LDC; 
b) Non Excluded: lines with zero tariff for US imports from LDCs.  
 
 
 
How much market access could one expect from implementing this proposal? For 
now suppose that meeting origin requirements would not be an obstacle to increasing 
exports to the US. Assume in addition that the LDCs have a sufficiently small share of 
US imports that supply response (i.e. output contraction in the US) can be neglected. 
Then, an estimate can be obtained by applying the standard partial equilibrium 
version of a trade model with product differentiation. Removing tariffs on LDC 
exports will lower the average price of imports in the US leading to an expansion of 
US imports at the product line level. In addition, there will be a substitution effect 
away from non-LDC suppliers towards LDCs because they receive this “97% duty-
free” proposal. And within the LDC group, there will be a substitution away from 
those that receive duty-free access towards those LDCs now benefiting from the “97% 
duty-free” proposal. 
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Table 6: LDC Export expansion from “97%” duty-free status proposal 
 
 
Source: authors’ computations. 
Note:  
Increase from total initial LDC exports to the US (US$ 11,433 million – see table 3) 
a) Elasticity values are aggregate import elasticity (ε) followed by elasticity of substitution 
between sources (σ), i.e. LDC and non-LDC exports to the US: 
 “central”:  
,
1g cε = −  and , , 6g c cσ ≠ = −  
  “low”:  
,
0.5g cε = −  and , , 2g c cσ ≠ = −  
  “high”:  
,
2g cε = −  and , , 10g c cσ ≠ = −   
see Carrère and De Melo (2008) for exact formula. 
b) the simulation concerned only the 510 non excluded lines (see table 5) with positive exports 
and positive applied tariff, i.e. 38.4% of the LDCs export with an average (trade weighted) 
applied tariff of 5.8% (7.3%). 
c) the simulation concerned only the 581 lines (see table 5) with positive exports and positive 
applied tariff. 
 
A range of resulting export expansion estimates for the “97%” proposal is given in 
table 6, cols. 1a and 1b. The more extreme estimates result from the (unrealistic) 
assumption of an infinite export supply elasticity (up to 26% increase in exports over 
the initial value). The more realistic central elasticity estimates in cols 1b (and 2b) 
suggest that exports could expand by 11% from the base value (and by 8% had we 
assumed an export supply of 5 instead of 10). Going all the way to duty free-status 
(cols. 2a and 2b) would yield about an additional third more expansion to about 15% 
(col. 2b). Given the aggregate initial exports of $1.4 billion to the US, application o of 
the “97% rule” would increase exports to the US by about $1 billion and by $1.5 
billion from a full DFQF access to the US market.  
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5. Other Barriers to Market Access: Rules of Origin  
 
The QUAD and other OECD countries use rules of origin to confer originating status 
for preference-receiving countries. The RoO are necessary to prevent trade deflection 
(i.e. importing from the low-tariff partner and then exporting to other countries in 
the preferential zone) for any PTA short of a CU. RoO also apply to the non-reciprocal 
preferences granted under the GSP and EBA. RoO are elaborate: they include regime-
wide rules of origin and product-specific-rules of origin (PSRO). Both are complex, 
particularly PSRO. Regime-wide rules include (i) a de-minimis (or tolerance) rule; (ii) 
cumulation; (iii) absorption (or roll up); (iv) duty-drawback provisions or their 
elimination; (v) origin certification procedures. PSRO are even more complex.  
 
Annex 3, table A3.1 summarizes regime-wide and PSRO for GSP recipients in the 
QUAD. These rules are very different across GSP granting countries. Given that we 
have seen that LDCs have similar baskets of goods exported to the different OECD 
countries, the differences in these rules must be costly since different paper work 
must be carried to export the same product at different destinations.  
 
An important first observation is that the LDCs which export rather similar products 
to  different OECD countries face different RoO--both regime-wide and PSRO—across 
destinations. Having to fulfill different requirements for the same product when 
exporting to different destinations increases the overall costs of exporting when 
exporting under a preferential trade regime like the GSP or EBA. 
 
How much of the costs necessary to meet origin requirements are unavoidable? There 
is no quick answer to this question because of the diversity of product characteristics 
and more generally because the HS was not designed to conform to product 
characteristics. Hence using the HS system to classify products is not very useful 
when it comes to identifying whether a product has met the requirement of “sufficient 
transformation” to qualify for preferential status. Indeed, it is partly for this reason 
that complex PSRO have been put in place. At the same time, these PSRO are 
different across partners for a given HS6 product.  
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Because of their complexity (see the description in annex 3), it is difficult to assess the 
costs of these RoO.  Below we use several measures to illustrate the likely costs for 
LDC exporters to the EU and US markets. Three conclusions transpire from the 
summary description and evaluation of the restrictiveness of these rules: 
• the rules are complex and vary a lot across sectors 
• the rules are generally more stringent for the products with the highest 
preference margins 
• In spite of similar export baskets to the US and the EU and of the fact that face 
the same set of RoO as other partners, the same set of RoO have different 
effects across countries. 
 
5.1 Measuring the complexity of Rules of Origin 
 
In the case of the EU, there are more than 500 different Product-Specific Rules of 
Origin (PSRO). These are described in annex 3.6  While the US has fewer PSRO than 
the EU, they too are complex. Here (and elsewhere), the complexity of both systems 
of PSRO is summarized by an overall restrictiveness “R-index”. The index is 
constructed at the product line level so that increasing values of the index represent a 
more restrictive PSRO. As explained in the annex, the ordinal index takes values in 
the range: 
1 7ir≤ ≤  
so that ( 1)ir =  corresponds to a PSRO that is easy to satisfy and ( 7)ir =  to one that is 
difficult to satisfy.7  This synthetic index is far from an accurate measure of the 
restrictiveness of the EU and US system of PSRO that apply to preferential imports, 
including those from the LDCs. Furthermore, as mentioned above, it is a cardinal 
                     
6
 As detailed in annex 3, the EU has been contemplating reforming its PSRO and replacing it by a 
uniform rule (a value-content rule of 30% for LDCs). But this has not happened yet, although 
promising first steps have taken place with the simplification of the vessel requirement for fishing and 
the move to a single transformation rule in T&A. These simplifications will be applied to all EPA 
signatories. 
7 For example a value ( )4ir =  corresponds either to a change of tariff classification at the Heading 
(HS-4 level) , a VC requirement limiting non-originating inputs to 60% of the ex-works price, or a 
wholly obtained criterion accompanied by an exclusion and a technical requirement  At the lower end 
( )1ir = corresponds to a no change of  tariff line heading, or an allowance added to one of the following 
single criteria: (exclusion, CTC at the sub-heading level, or wholly obtained). At the more restrictive 
end ( )7ir =  usually the PSRO consists of three requirements including a technical requirement, and 
the CTC must take place at the Heading or Chapter level. 
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index so one cannot make quantitative comparisons across different values of the R-
index. Yet, the index is useful to check the correlates between the r-index values and 
the preferential margins. It is also useful to see how countries are affected (in terms of 
the severity of the overall bundle of RoO) by the same set of PSRO.  
 
5.2 High Preference Margin Products Face Restrictive PSRO in the EU 
market 
 
If market access were only determined by preferential margins, then as a first 
approximation, the LDCs should not face tougher RoO requirements on the products 
for which they have higher preferential margins. Table 7 splits the sample into three 
categories of tariff lines: those with high, medium and low preference margins. As can 
be seen, the simple averages show that the average value of the R-index is higher for 
the tariff lines with high preference margins (i.e. preferential margin peaks). 8 
 
Table 7: LDC Preferential Margins and the PSRO index a 
7a:  EU 
 
Nber of lines with 
positive LDC export  
Weighted Average 
Preference margin 
Weighted Average 
R-Index value  
Preferential Margin peaksb 570 17.13% 6.08 
Low Preferential Marginb 824 0.01% 3.19 
Total number of tariff lines 3509 4.64% 3.93 
Notes: 
a/LDC as a group 
b/ the Preferential Margin tariff peaks are defined for tariff lines with preference margins in excess of 
12% and low margins for tariff lines below 1% preferential margins.  
Source: authors’ computations. 
7b:  US 
 
 
Nber of lines with 
positive LDC export  
Weighted Average 
Preference margin 
Weighted Average 
R-Index value  
Preferential Margin peaksb 267 8.08% 6.64 
Low Preferential Marginb 1009 0.002% 6.10 
Total number of tariff lines 1783 0.86% 6.33 
Notes: 
a/LDC as a group 
b/ the Preferential Margin tariff peaks are defined for tariff lines with preference margins in excess of 
3% and low margins for tariff lines below 0.05% preferential margins.  
Source: authors’ computations. 
                     
8
 When available, an alternative is to study the correlates of utilization rates, an approach taken in 
several studies where utilization rates of preferences are available. These cross-sectional studies show 
that after controlling for the level of preferential access, utilization rates are lower for tariff lines with 
higher values for the PSRO index. 
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A second exercise is to try and detect whether, because of the products they export to 
the EU and the US, the LDCs face tougher RoO for a given preference level. Figure 6 
plots a linear fit (with the corresponding 95% confidence interval) and smoothing 
regression results for 2004 over the countries exporting to the EU and the US under 
preferential status and hence facing PSRO.9 LDCs are emphasized in red in the 
scatter plot. These countries appear to be significantly above and below the regression 
line. This reflects the heterogeneity among the LDCs in terms of export composition 
to EU. For LDCs above the line (e.g. Nepal, Myanmar, Cambodia, Bangladesh, Cape 
Verde, Mozambique or Madagascar), they are facing more restrictive RoO than the 
average preferential-receiving country of the sample.  
 
Should the EU or US simplify its current PSRO, it would most likely do so for all 
preferential trading partners. The estimates here suggest that the LDCs above the line 
would gain relatively more than other GSP or ACP beneficiaries and hence should 
push for a simplification of the current complex system of requirements necessary to 
establish origin under preferential access  
                     
9
 Note that in practice, countries do not face identical PSRO, so the assumption here that all countries 
face the same RoO is not strictly correct, but only approximately the case.  
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Figure 6a:  Smoothing regression of the export weighted average of the EU RoO index 
on the export weighted average (unadjusted) preferential margin, 219 countries, 2004  
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Notes: Smoothing Regression using exported weighted data for the PSRO index and for the 
(unadjusted) preferential Margin. 
Source: authors’ computations. 
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Figure 6b:  Smoothing regression of the export weighted average of the US RoO index 
on the export weighted average (unadjusted) preferential margin, 205 countries, 2004  
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Notes: Smoothing Regression using exported weighted data for the PSRO index and for the 
(unadjusted) preferential Margin. 
Source: authors’  
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2009.11 
 
 31 
6. Conclusions 
Several findings emerge from this detailed disaggregated investigation of preferences 
received by LDCs in the EU and US markets, the two largest recipients of LDC exports 
among OECD countries: 
• Preferential access is greater in the EU than the US (where T&A are excluded 
from preferential status except for AGOA beneficiaries) as LDCs virtually have 
DFQF access to the EU market 
• Taking into account that the EU and the US are both engaged in FTAs with 
countries that compete with the LDCs substantially diminishes the effective 
preferential margin received by LDCs to about 3% in the EU market 
• Taken as a group, .on a trade-weighted basis, the LDC group is discriminated 
against in the US market, this in spite of AGOA which gave DFQF access to 22 
LDCs from SSA in 2004. Thus, as a group, i.e. if they were considered to be 
one country, the 50 LDCs are getting less preferential access in the US market 
than other exporters of the goods exported by the LDCs. 
• Should DOHA come to a successful ending in the sense that tariffs are reduced 
according to a “Swiss formula”, effective preferential access to LDCs will be 
negligible in the EU and still negative in the US. 
• If the US were to apply the “97%  rule”,  LDC might increase exports to the US 
by about 10% or about $1billion. 
• RoO applied by the US and the EU to GSP beneficiaries are complicated and 
different even when defined at the HS-6 line level. This implies that an LDC 
exporting any product will have to meet different requirements for different 
destinations thereby adding costs to exporting. 
• The PSRO applied by the EU and US are complex. They reduce further the 
effective market for LDCs in the EU and US markets. 
 
Two conclusions for ‘action’ emerge.  
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Two sets of recommendations emerge from the analysis. First, the US should DFQF 
access to LDCs to level the playing field to avoid giving less market access than to 
other trade partners with whom they have FTAs. So the first recommendation is that 
if the OECD countries are “serious” about the development potential of TPFD, they 
should grant DFQF market access to the LDCs. Presently, for the QUAD, this is only 
the case for the EU. DFQF access to the LDCs, will only avoid effectively 
discriminating against them. Such measures should be taken regardless of the 
observation that the preferential margin received by LDCs, which is already small, 
will be further reduced via multilateral tariff reductions at the MFN level. 
 
The second area of action relates to Rules of Origin. 10 These are costly for all partners 
wishing to benefit from preferential status. How costly they are is difficult to ascertain 
with any degree of precision. Nonetheless, there is growing evidence that these costs, 
administrative and distortionary alike are sufficiently important, that OECD 
countries should seek to reduce them. 
 
The first part of the recommendation relates to harmonization. If taken seriously,  
LDCs would face the same RoO at the HS-6 level whichever market they export to. 
This is currently not the case. Since it is known that compliance costs are higher for 
small firms, which represents the majority of LDC firms, the LDCs are already at a 
disadvantage. Given that they sell the similar products across countries, and that each 
LDC usually exports the same product across the QUAD, having to deal with different 
RoO across destinations adds to export costs. 
 
The second part of the recommendation is to simplify the current system of RoO. 
This recommendation extends beyond treatment to LDCs, applying to all preferential 
trading agreements. Such simplification might however end up being most helpful to 
the LDCs. This would eliminate some of the biases these rules impose on LDCs How 
to go about it is more difficult to ascertain, but there are several options, some of 
which, are examined below. One step in the right direction would to establish simple 
and mutually consistent cumulation rules. The EU has set an example in this regard 
with the PANEURO system, precisely designed to facilitate cumulation across 
preferential zones. 
                     
10
 Some of the recommendations here were made in Cadot and de Melo (2008).  
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Another way to simplify the rules would be to use a single, across-the-board rule to 
foster transparency and mitigate capture. Clearly, technical requirements should be 
targeted for elimination in priority, being the most opaque, difficult to harmonize, 
and capture-prone instruments. Leaving aside agricultural products that could still 
operate under the ‘wholly obtained’ criterion, and keeping in mind that any uniform 
rule will affect industries and countries differently, two avenues could be considered: 
(i) a simple change of tariff classification, say at the subheading (HS 6) level so that it 
is not too restrictive); (ii) a uniform value-content (VC) rule. 
 
The change of tariff classification has the advantage of simplicity, transparency, and 
low administrative costs. But the HS tariff nomenclature was designed to collect trade 
statistics, not to separate products and confer origin, so defining the change of tariff 
classification at a uniform level would produce erratic results across sectors. This 
would call for exceptions to uniformity, opening up the Pandora Box of special deals. 
Moreover, a change of tariff classification would not lend itself easily to differential 
treatment for LDCs, should that be an objective (see below).   
 
As for a VC rule, notwithstanding its conceptual clarity, it may be less than 
straightforward to apply in practice. It may increase producer risk due to the 
sensitivity of costs to exchange-rate, wage and commodity-price fluctuations and is 
also burdensome to apply for customs officials. However, it is simple to specify, 
transparent, and allows for differential treatment of LDCs. All told, if specified 
properly it probably stands out as the best candidate for an across-the-board 
criterion, ideally in combination, at the exporter’s choice, with a change of tariff 
classification.   
 
The third part of the recommendation is to have preferential RoO for LDCs, i.e. to 
have simpler RoO for the LDCs. Here again, there are several possibilities. A simple 
first step in the reform would consist of eliminating RoO requirements for tariff lines 
with preferential margins below 3% or perhaps even 5% for all LDCs (the rate could 
be agreed upon in the context of multilateral negotiations at the WTO). This would 
be an all-round winning proposition since resources would be freed for other 
purposes, especially in developing countries, but also for consumers in developed 
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countries who would no longer bear part of the increased costs associated with 
compliance. A second step would be to allow for differential treatment not across 
sectors, but across beneficiaries, with full cumulation and low VC requirements for 
LDCs reflecting the empirical observation that the “slices” of value added performed 
in LDCs in cross-border production networks are generally thin.  
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